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NOTES
man and woman enter into marriage there is a presumption
that the marriage, though null, was nevertheless contracted in
good faith.7 He who alleges bad faith must bear the burden of
proof and if there is doubt as to the good or bad faith of a party,
the issue will be resolved in favor of his good faith. 8 It has also
been said that the issue of good or bad faith, which necessarily
raises a question of fact, should be determined by the trial court.9
It is submitted that if evidence as to the good or bad faith of a
party cannot be produced, or if there is a conflict in that which
is produced, the presumption of good faith should prevail. How-
ever, if the question is never raised at the trial level, it would
appear that the case should be remanded to the lower court for
determination of the issue.
Charles Lindsey
LABOR LAW- PEACEFUL PICKETING NOT RESTRAINT AND
COERCION OF EMPLOYEES
An employer charged that a union was restraining and
coercing employees in the exercise of their right to refrain from
union membership. After the union had been certified, unsuc-
cessful contract negotiations precipitated a strike. The strike
continued for two years, during which time the striking em-
ployees were replaced by non-union employees. In a subsequent
election requested by the employer the new employees voted
overwhelmingly against representation by the union. The union
continued picketing and the company filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges with the NLRB. The picketing was at all times
peaceful. The employer charged that the union was picketing to
force it to recognize the union as bargaining agent for its em-
ployees, and thus to compel the employees to join the union or
lose their jobs. The trial examiner, relying on legislative history
and past Board decisions, rejected the employer's charge. The
Board reversed, finding that the conduct of the union was
designed to cause the employer to force its employees to join
the union or be discharged, and therefore violated Section
8(b) (1) (A).' On appeal the court of appeals, held, reversed.
7. Prince v. Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So.2d 128 (1956) ; Succession of Pigg,
228 La. 799, 84 So.2d 196 (1955) ; Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 62 So.2d 495
(1952) ; Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947).
8. Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 38 So.2d 502 (1949) ; Succession
of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947) ; Succession of Marinoni, 183 La.
776, 164 So. 797 (1935) ; Succession of Navarro, 24 La. Ann. 298 (1872) ; Eason
v. Alexander Shipyards, 47 So.2d 114 (La. App. 1950).
9. Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice
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Section 8(b) (1) (A's) prohibition against union coercion to
compel employees to join a union is not applicable to peaceful
picketing, but is applicable only to the use of force or violence,
or threats of economic reprisal against individuals. Drivers Local
639 v. NLRB (Curtis Bros. Inc.), 43 L.R.R.M. 2156 (D.C. App.
1958)
Section 7 of the Wagner Act 2 declared that employees should
be free to join, form or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing and
to engage in other concerted activities to promote their own
welfare. The act further declared certain specified conduct of
employers was unfair to employees seeking to exercise the free-
dom given them by the act. The Taft-Hartley Act amended
Section 7 of the Wagner Act by declaring that employees also
had the right to refrain from collective bargaining activities and
made certain union activities which interfered with this right
unfair labor practices. Section 8(b) (1) (A) 4 made it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7. In Na-
tional Maritime Union,5 the first case arising under Section
8(b) (1) (A), the Board refused to find that the section pro-
scribed peaceful picketing, but found on the basis of legislative
history that Congress was interested only in eliminating physical
violence and intimidation by unions and their representatives,
or the use of threats of economic action against specific indi-
viduals in an effort to compel them to join the union. The
Board said that this section was not concerned with the objec-
tive of union activity, but was normally directed to the means
by which the objective was accomplished. So long as the strike's
ubjective was directly related to the interest of the strikers and
not directed primarily at compelling other employees to forego
rights protected by Section 7,6 there was no violation of Section
for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."
2. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1935).
3. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., amending 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 141, 157 (1935): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a) (3)." This section is hereafter referred to as Section 7.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1947).
5. National Maritime Union of America (The Texas Company), 78 N.L.J.B.
971 (1947).
6. Id. at 973, "The touchstone of this section is normally the means by which
[Vol. XIX
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8(b) (1) (A). In applying Section 8(b) (1) (A) the Board has
made no effort to distinguish between strikes as such and picket-
ing, but has treated the two activities as one. Originally the
Board refused to find that peaceful picketing in any situation
violated the section,7 but later modified its position on this point
and found that there were situations in which a peaceful strike
would violate 8 (b) (1) (A). In Pinkerton's National Detective
Agency, Inc." the union struck to force the employer to discharge
employees who were not union members, although there was no
valid union security agreement. The Board found the strike to
be an unfair labor practice since it was directed primarily at
compelling an employee to forego rights protected under Section
7.9 Except for this situation the Board followed the rule of
National Maritime Union until 1957. When the instant case
was before the Board in 1957 it found that peaceful picketing
by a union after losing a representation election was a violation
it is accomplished, so long as its objective is directly related to the interest of the
strikers and not directed primarily at compelling other employees to forego rights
which section 7 protects."
7. District 50, United Mine Workers of America, 106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953)
(union struck to force employer to recognize it where another union had been
certified) ; Painters District Council No. 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) (union
struck to induce employees to withdraw certification petition) ; Medford Building
and Construction Trades Council, 96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951) (union picketed to
force employer to agree to illegal union security contract) ; United Construction
Workers, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951) (union struck to force employer to join an
employers' association which would have forced employees to join the union under
a union security clause contained in a contract with the employers' association);
Miami Copper Company, 92 N.L.R.B. 322 (1950) (minority union forced com-
pany, through strike threats, to negotiate on grievances outside presence of the
certified union) ; Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, 87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949)
(union sought to force employer to agree to an illegal union shop clause, picketing
the plant and following company trucks and picketing them at delivery points) ;
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948)
(union picketed to force employer to recognize it after employees had refused to
join the union; also picketed jobs where the employees were working) ; Perry
Norvell Company, 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948) (after one union had been recognized,
disgruntled employees struck; and when the recognized union refused to sanction
the strike, they joined the rival union and demanded recognition).
The Board found 8(b) (1) (A) violations where there had been threats of
force against employees, Pinkerton's Detective Agency, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205
(1950) ; Clara Val Packing Company 87 N.LR.B. 703 (1949) ; Seamprufe, Inc.
82 N.L.R.B. 892 (1949) ; where there had been physical force used against em-
ployees, Painters' District Council No. 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) ; United Con-
struction Workers, 94 N.L.R.B. 1731 (1951) ; United Furniture Workers of
America, Local 309, 81 N.L.R.B. 886 (1949) ; where there had been mass picket-
ing, Local 1150, United Electrical, etc. Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949) ; Inter-
national Longshoremen & Warehousemen Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948) ; and
where there had been threats of economic reprisal against employees, Pinkerton's
National Detective Agency, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950) ; Clara Val Packing
Company, 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949) ; Seamprufe, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 892 (1949).
8. 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950).
9. Thus the Board said the case fell within the exception to the rule of Na-
tional Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 973 (1947): "The touchstone of this
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of 8 (b) (1) (A).l In Alloy Manufacturing Co." the Board went
even further and found that placing the employer's name on a
"We Do Not Patronize" list after losing an election was a viola-
tion of 8 (b) (1) (A). In the Alloy case the Board expressly
overruled National Maritime Union.
In the instant case the court of appeals refused to accept the
Board's revised interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A), and held that
the section did not proscribe peaceful picketing. 12 The interpre-
tation given the legislative history of 8 (b) (1) (A) by the trial
examiner and the dissenting Board member was accepted by the
court.'8  Section 8(b) (1) (A) was construed to prohibit only
section is normally the means by which it is accomplished, so long as its objective
is directly related to the interest of the strikers and not directed primarily at com-
pelling other employees to forego rights which section 7 protects." (Emphasis
added.)
10. Curtis Bros. Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 41 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1957). Since
that decision the Board has consistently found that peaceful picketing by a union
after losing a representation election was a violation of 8(b) (1) (A). Retail
Clerks International Association, 120 N.L.R.B. #189, 42 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1958)
(union continued to picket store after losing an election called despite union's dis-
claimer of representation of employees) ; Paint Makers Union, 120 N.L.R.B. # 89,
42 L.R.R.M. 1195 (1958) (union demanded recognition which was refused; when
union began picketing employer petitioned for an election, which was held over
the union's disclaimer of any interest in securing recognition at that time. When
union continued picketing after losing the election, Board found an 8(b) (1) (A)
violation) ; Operating Engineers, 119 N.L.R.B. 320 (1957) (union lost election,
continued picketing) ; Machinists Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957) (after losing
election union continued picketing and placed employer's name on "We Do Not
Patronize" list).
11. 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957) Since the decision in the instant case, the Alloy
case has been reversed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. NLRB
v. IAM Lodge 942 (Alloy Mfg. Co.), 43 L.R.R.M. 2548 (9th Cir. 1959). In that
decision the court did not pass on the issue of union picketing, as it was not
properly presented on the appeal. The court held that placing the employer's name
on a "We Do Not Patronize" list was not a violation of 8(b) (1) (A), but was
protected by the free speech provisions of Section 8(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
12. Thus the court announced it agreed with the interpretation of 8(b) (1) (A)
given by the Board in National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1947).
13. The following excerpts from the legislative history seem to be the most
often quoted parts:
"The purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that where unions, in
their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which if an employer in-
dulged in them would be unfair labor practices, such as making threats or false
promises or false statements, the union also shall be guilty of unfair labor
practices." 93 Cong. Rec. 4136 (April 25, 1947) Senator Ball.
Senator Taft: "The effect of the pending amendment (8biA) is that the
Board may call the union before them exactly as it has called the employer,
and say, 'Here are the rules of the game. You must cease and desist from
coercing and restraining the employees who want to work from going to work
and earning the money which they are entitled to earn.' The Board may say,
'You can persuade them; you can put up signs; you can conduct any form of
propaganda you want to in order to persuade them, but you cannot, by threat
of force or threat of economic reprisal, prevent them from exercising their
right to work.' As I see it, that is the effect of the amendment." 93 Cong.
Rec. 4561 (May 2, 1947).
Senator Ball: ". . . the only purpose of (Section 8blA) is to protect the rights
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coercive conduct of the unions, 14 such as the use of force, vio-
lence and economic reprisal.15 To interpret Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
as the Board did in the instant case would make Section 1316
meaningless. Section 13 provides that nothing in the act shall
be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike, except as specifically provided. 17
Section 8(b) (1) (A) does not specifically prohibit strikes or
picketing, but is worded in very broad terms. For this reason
the court felt it should not be interpreted so as to interfere
with the right to strike. Furthermore, to interpret Section
8 (b) (1) (A) as proscribing peaceful picketing would make Sec-
of employees, to free them from the coercion of goon squads and other strong
arm organizing techniques which a few unions use today." Radio Broadcast
inserted in Congressional Record by Senator Ball, 93 Cong. Rec. A2378 (May
13, 1947).
Senator Taft: "I can see nothing in the pending measure which as suggested
by the Senator from Oregon (Morse) would in some way outlaw strikes.
It would not outlaw threats against employees. It would not outlaw anybody
striking who wanted to strike. It would not prevent anyone using the strike
in a legitimate way, conducting peaceful picketing or employing persuasion.
All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as would prevent
people from going to work if they wished to go to work. 93 Cong. Rec. 4563
(May 2, 1947).
14. The trial examiner, relying chiefly on National Maritime Union, supra,
and Perry Norvell, 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948) found that Section 8(b) (1) (A) did
not apply to peaceful picketing. See Intermediate Report, Curtis Bros. Inc., 119
N.L.R.B. 232 (1958). Board Member Murdock dissented from the majority when
the instant case was before the Board.
15. It is necessary to understand the restricted meaning apparently given the
term "economic reprisal" by past Boards and adopted by the court in the instant
case. Apparently the term economic reprisal is used to apply to those situations
where a union which is established in the plant, although not necessarily recog-
nized, threatens specific individuals with loss of their job or other economic sanc-
tions if they do not cooperate with the union. See Peerless Tool and Engineering
Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 853 (1955) (union threatened not to handle grievances for em-
ployee unless he paid strike assessment) ; Pinkerton's National Detective Agency,
Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950) (union forced employer to discharge two workers
expelled from the union for non-payment of dues; there was no valid union security
agreement) ; Clara Val Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949) (union expelled
employee from membership because she had not honored picket line at another
plant; then union forced employer to discharge her under union security clause) ;
Seamprufe, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 892 (1949) (union threatened employee with loss of
job if he did not join the union). Cf. Miami Copper Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 322 (1950)
(minority union sought to force employer to deal with it on grievances within unit
certified for majority union; no violation of 8(b) (1) (A) found - no economic
reprisal) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1959)
(union did not violate 8(b) (1) (A) by telling strikebreakers they might be ex-
pelled from union for their strikebreaking activities; union had right to expel
them.)
16. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1947) "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically pro-
vided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications
on that right."
17. The word "strike" as used in Section 13 has been held to include picketing.
See Sales Drivers, AFL v. N.L.R.B, 229 F.2d 514, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972
(1955); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949).
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tion 8(b) (4) (C)18 redundant. Section 8(b) (4) (c) makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to strike, picket or refuse to
work to force an employer to recognize or bargain with a par-
ticular labor union if another labor organization has been certi-
fied. This section clearly was not applicable in the instant case,
but the interpretation given 8(b) (1) (A) by the Board would
have rendered Section 8(b) (4) (C) applicable in future cases
to which 8(b) (1) (A) would also apply. Thus 8(b) (1) (A) would
cover everything covered by 8 (b) (4) (c), making the latter sec-
tion unnecessary. Congress probably would not have enacted
Section 8 (b) (4) (C) if it had been intended that Section 8 (b)-
(1) (A) would cover the same subject matter.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case properly
interpreted and applied Section 8(b) (1) (A).19 The legislative
history, while admittedly not conclusive, appears to support the
court.20 The Board had held that where the words of the statute
are clear there is no need to resort to legislative history. Thus
the Board found there was clearly coercion and 8(b) (1) (A)
would apply. While the principle relied on by the Board is un-
doubtedly sound,21 its application in the instant case is ques-
tionable. The lack of agreement between the present Board and
past Boards and between the members of the present Board
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1947): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents - (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the
employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is ... (C) forcing or requiring any employer to
recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of
his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative
of such employees under the provisions of section 9."
19. Despite the holding of the court in the instant case the Board has con-
tinued to find that peaceful picketing by a union after losing a representation elec-
tion violates Section 8(b) (1) (A). Electrical Workers Union (Mid-Island Elec-
trical Sales Corp.), 122 N.L.R.B. # 105, 43 L.R.R.M. 1205 (1959). Furthermore,
in another very recent case the Board held that a union violated Section 8(b)-
(1) (A) by securing recognition as exclusive bargaining agent for employees and
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement when the union did not represent
a majority of the employees. No election had been held. The contract did not con-
tain a union security clause. The union had been attempting to organize the
plant with little success, and some employees had gone on strike in protest against
a wage reduction. When the employer signed the contract the employees returned
to work. The Board found that the union coerced the employees by signing the
contract as exclusive bargaining agent. Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122
N.L.R.B. # 142, 43 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1959).
20. See footnote 13 supra. The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act is
collected in two volumes. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948).
21. Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 U.S. 98 (1936). See
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Company, 299 U.S. 445 (1936).
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illustrates the need for resorting to legislative history to deter-
mine what is meant by coercion in Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
If either organizational or recognition picketing is effective,
it will result in a loss of business to the employer. When this
occurs, employees are confronted with the possibility of loss of
their jobs or reduction in pay if the employer cannot withstand
the economic loss. The only other alternative is for the em-
ployees to join the union. Thus the conflict here is between three
parties: the employees who do not want to join the union; the
employer who wants to avoid the increased labor costs and other
problems that accompany unionization; and the union which is
seeking to improve wages and working conditions of its members
by strengthening bargaining power and eliminating non-union
shops. It is clear that all three parties are seeking legitimate
ends. Congress, in the National Labor Relations Act, has set out
the rules under which the economic struggle is to be waged.
Section 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits the union's use of force, violence,
or threats of economic reprisal. It was not intended to deny the
union its right to picket the employer premises, urging those
sympathetic to the union cause to support the union. If the union
is to be deprived of this weapon, the decision should be made by
Congress. 22
Sidney D. Fazio
MILITARY LAW - USE OF MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL BY
COURT-MARTIAL MEMBERS DISALLOWED
The defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of several
charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice by a general
court-martial.' Thereafter the law officer 2 fully advised the
22. See Cox, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Practices, 35 L.R.R.M. 56
(1954) wherein the author takes the position that neither picketing for recognition
nor organizational picketing should be permitted after the employees have signified
in an election whether in truth the union is their organization. However, he ap-
parently feels that the present act does not cover the problem and recommends
that Section 8(b) (4) (C) be amended to cover it.
1. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 16, c. 1041, 70A STAT. 42 (1956),
10 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V 1958) : "The three kinds of courts-martial in each of
the armed forces are- (1) general courts-martial, consisting of a law officer and
not less than five members; (2) special courts-martial, consisting of not less
than three members; and (3) summary courts-martial, consisting of one commis-
sioned officer."
Any officer on active duty may serve on a court-martial. Enlisted personnel
are also eligible to serve on a court-martial if the accused requests their appoint-
ment to the court. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 25, c. 1041, 70A
STAT. 45 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (Supp. V 1958).
2. The law officer is peculiar to the general court-martial. "The authority con-
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